Purpose: This study examines how the architecture of economic regulation in Iran has been rearranged following the establishment of the National Business Licensing Gateway, focusing on entry conditions, information flows, regulatory authority, oversight, and inter-agency relations.

Methodology: This qualitative and exploratory study uses an institutional analysis approach. Data were collected from official documents and five in-depth semi-structured interviews with experts involved in policymaking and implementing licensing reforms. Data were analyzed using six-phase thematic analysis. An institutional analysis framework and six dimensions of regulatory architecture guided the interpretation of evidence.

Findings: Seven empirical patterns indicate changes in entry rules, centralization and standardization of information, process visibility and traceability, and a shift toward ex post oversight. However, some ex ante controls have persisted, alongside conflicts and bargaining among regulatory agencies and ambiguity concerning the boundaries of licensing instruments. Changes in information flows and licensing processes have been more evident than changes in regulatory authority and oversight mechanisms.

Conclusion: The Gateway represents more than a technical change and has contributed to an asymmetric rearrangement of the regulatory architecture. Reforms in entry rules and information infrastructure have advanced further, while changes in regulatory authority, inter-agency relations, and the transition from ex ante controls to ex post oversight remain constrained by existing arrangements and institutional bargaining. This condition can be conceptualized as an “incomplete regulatory transition.”